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Abstract Making the Internet ofThings (IoT) a reality will 
contribute to extend the context-aware ability of numerous 
sensitive applications. We can foresee that the context of 
users will include not only their own spatio-temporal con­
ditions but also those of the things situated in their ambient 
environment and at the same time, thanks to the loT, those 
that are located in other remote spaces. Consequently, next­
generation context managers have to interact with the IoT 
underlying technologies and must, even more than before, 
address both privacy and quality of context (QoC) require­
ments. In this article, we show that the notions of privacy 
and QoC are intimately related and sometimes contradictory 
and survey the recent works addressing them. Current solu­
tions usually consider only one notion, and very few of them 
started to bridge privacy and QoC. We identify some of the 
remaining challenges that next-generation context managers 
have to deal with to favour users' acceptability by provid­
ing both the optimal QoC level and the appropriate privacy 
protection. 
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The next big step in our electronic society will be the real­
ization of an Internet of Things (loT) [6, 50]. The Internet 
will connect not only people but also machines and smart 
objects or things, thanks to wireless connectivity. The ''Any­
where, anyhow and anytime" communication paradigm of 
mobile and ubiquitous computing gets extended to "Any­
thing, anyone and any service" with the IoT [92]. 
Thanks to a variety of sensing and potentially mobile 
devices, it is becoming possible to perceive events and 
changes within the ambient space surrounding users. This 
implies to sense precisely the current context of users in 
order to determine what is their situation and what should 
be the behaviour of a context-aware system. The impor­
tance of this notion of context has been identified by Coutaz 
et al. (27] in demonstrating that context information can 
enrich human activities with new services able to adapt 
to the circumstances in which they are used. As context 
information is central to the decisions that context-aware 
systems must take, the quality of context (QoC) has to be 
known and evaluated carefully. Without this knowledge, 
the service provider would be unsure about the quality of 
the context information received and inadequate service 
adaptations could be triggered by data of unknown quality. 
Besides, as context data may reveal sensitive information 
about persons, Iike their location or their activity at any time 
of the day or night, the success of a context-aware service is 
highly dependent on how this service enables users to feel 
in control of their privacy. 
Context-aware services under the paradigm of ambient 
intelligence (AmI) were so far lirnited to closed environ­
ments (e.g. a room, a bouse or a building) where a number 
of specific functions known at design time can be supported. 
The IoT expands the AmI paradigm to open scenarios where 
new functions or services need to be accomodated at run 
time without them having been necessarily considered at 
design time [70]. This paradigm shift is being recognized 
by the research community [86] under various terms like 
emerging pervasive environments [11] or cyber-physical 
systems [26]. The IoT thus brings new opportunities by 
enabling enriched context-aware services, but it also raises 
new challenges for managing the QoC of the tremendous 
amount of collected information while at the same time pre­
serving the privacy of the users. Privacy is one of the major 
ethical concems of users with respect to the IoT [50] and 
is a crucial open issue that may limit the realization of the 
IoT vision [70]. We consider that new research directions 
studying p1ivacy jointly with QoC are the most promising 
to take up the · challenge for a context management in the 
IoT that will be technically effective and well accepted by 
the users. 
In this article, we first outline in Section 2 the new chal­
lenges faced by context management in the IoT resulting 
from the complex.interdependencies between QoC and pri­
vacy. In Section 3, we precisely define what is QoC and 
discuss the recent solutions and open issues for QoC man­
agement. Similarly in Section 4, after defining privacy, we 
survey current privacy protection techniques and analyse 
their applicability for context management in the loT. We 
finally discuss in Section 5 the works that started to bridge 
privacy and QoC and identify challenging issues related to 
the IoT before concluding this survey in Section 6. 
2 Challenges for context management in the IoT 
The IoT is the concept that aims to extend the regular Inter­
net to the real-world physical objects [6]. Consequently, a 
large number of things can be, at any time during their 
Hfe cycle, either temporarily or permanently, connected to 
the global network infrastructure. These things have to be 
identified and accessed ubiquitously. Sorne of them can 
be directly connected by natively embedding communica­
tion capabilities, while others are classical raw things or 
physical infrastructures to which one or more additive com­
munication devices are associated. Moreover, some things 
are situated in fixed locations while others can be mobile 
because they move or are moved from some place to another 
one. Things, by using technologies such as RFID, wireless 
sensors networks, smart objects networks, etc., can pro­
vide some data related to their own identity, location, state, 
behaviour and/or to those of the environmental conditions · 
they can perceive. The control of this data dissemination 
is left either to the owner of the abject or to a trustworthy 
mandated operator. 
Making the Internet of Things a reality will contribute 
to extend the "context aware" ability of numerous sensi­
tive applications. We can envisage from now on that the 
context of users will include not only their own spatio­
temporal conditions but also those of the "things" that 
are situated in their ambient environment and at the same 
time, thanks to the IoT, those that are located in other 
remote spaces. Consequently, next-generation context man­
agers, like the ones envisioned in the INCOME project [4], 
have to internet with the loT underlying technologies. More 
precisely, they have to (1) collect data that are originally pro­
duced by the devices spread around the loT, (2) iteratively 
process and propagate it as context data within a network 
of intermediate consumer/producer entities and (3) provide 
computed high-level context information to context-aware 
applications assisting and helping users. 
A context manager is a software entity computing high­
level information from various sources of data. Its func­
tionalities include context data acquisition, context data 
processing (fusion, aggregation, interpretation, inference) 
and context data presentation to context-aware applications. 
These applications are classically named as final context 
data consumers, while entities providing raw data are con­
sidered as producers. A component within a context man­
ager that operates context data transformation is considered 
as both an intermediate context data consumer and producer. 
Consequently, such a context manager can, from the huge 
amount of data it collects from various connected things 
that may belong to multiple owners, build high-level con­
text information that is then delivered to any interested 
context-aware application. A single, direct and strong cou­
pling between one 01iginal context data provider and one 
final context data consumer does not exist anymore: they do 
not have to know or be aware of each other. 
Nevertheless, even more than in the case of ambient sys­
tems, the same requirements towards a context manager 
remain for both otiginal producers and final consumers. The 
final consumers have to deal with the knowledge about the 
quality of the context information provided by the context 
manager. According to the QoC level, they can adjust their 
own context sensitive reaction: the more the QoC is explicit 
and precise, the more the algorithms leading to relevant 
decision taking will be sophisticated. Similarly, context data 
owners and indirectly original context data providers need 
to be able to express privacy requirements about the data 
they accept to provide to a context manager. As illustrated 
in Fig. 1, next-generation context managers have to support 
the measurement of the QoC at each step of the context data 
life cycle: from its acquisition from the IoT to its delivery to 
context-aware applications. At the same time, these context 
managers also have to respect privacy requirements. 
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Fig. 1 Logical view of a privacy- and QoC-aware context manager 
We identify three new challenges brought by the IoT with 
respect to the management of privacy and QoC in context­
aware computing: 
1. Context data production/consumption decoupling: To
provide effective and efficient context management at
the scale of an IoT, context producers and consumers
should be decoupled both in time, working at differ­
ent times and speeds, and space, not having to know
each other. This calls for new solutions to protect the
privacy of the users who are the owners of context
information that could be exchanged and exploited
without them being aware of it. The very high amount
of data provided by context producers in a decoupled
and asynchronous way calls for an efficient and effec­
tive context data distribution solution. As mentioned
by Bellavista et al. [9], this includes powerful context
aggregation and filtering techniques in order to reduce
the final management overhead. Filtering data as close
as possible to the node that generated them avoids use­
less transmissions. Moreover, filtering context data on
their QoC according to the QoC requirements of con­
text consumers allows to further improve the filtering
efficiency.
2. QoC-aware privacy: As noticed in [9], context data
security including all the mechanisms to grant. privacy,
integrity and availability of data is still a neglected
issue. This can be explained by the existence of many
efficient solutions for addressing security problems,
for instance by exploiting access control and encryp­
tion mechanisms. However, these solutions usually fail
to consider the privacy loss that can result from indirect 
inferences by fusing different pieces of information 
coming from varions sources as in the case of context 
management in the IoT. Also, the high computational 
overhead that can result from the use of security mech­
anisms such as cryptography requires to limit their 
use to specific cases. Context data may have differ­
ent levels of privacy, and only some of them require 
proper security mechanisms. One promising research 
direction is to consider the specificities of context 
information and their associated QoC metadata. These 
metadata bring additional knowledge that could be 
exploited for enhancing privacy. This would enable 
to define QoC-aware pdvacy policies that may evolve 
dynamically according to the changes in the context 
of the user and to the quality of this context informa­
tion. For instance, users might allow the access to some 
of their private information but only under some spe­
cific conditions: dudng a meeting on a particular topic, 
with a timeliness constraint to activate the policy at 
most 30 s after the beginning of the meeting and with 
a particular group of persons. 
3. Dynamic interdependency of QoC and privacy: Even
though the interdependency of QoC and privacy has
already been tack:led in ambient intelligence and closed
context-aware systems, this issue gains importance in
the case of an open IoT when dealing with an abun­
dance of information generated by a very large nurnber
of highly diversified data sources distributed over large
geographical areas calling for dynamic solutions [26].
QoC may impact privacy in several ways. In order to
bave high qua!ity context information, fine-grained and 
precise data are necessary. This may be in contradic­
tion with the privacy requirements of users who would 
prefer to deliver only coarse-grain data. Moreover, a 
large amount of context information may need to be 
collected and then aggregated or fusioned, allowing to 
infer new context infonnation unforeseen in the first 
place. This is not compliant with the data minimization 
principle of privacy laws requiring to limit data collec­
tion as much as possible and this may allow to derive 
user's new information that was unknown or hidden so 
far, increasing the risks of privacy violation. Privacy 
also has consequences on QoC. lt may influence the 
QoC level of the context information that is to be deliv­
ered to context consumers by setting both its upper and 
Iower bounds. On the one hand, more precise informa­
tion may be considered as more intrusive. On the other 
hand, Iow quality data may allow to infer false context 
information with potentially bad repercussions on the 
user's privacx
'. 
3 Quality of context 
In this section, we first define the concept of QoC. As a 
single largely accepted definition of QoC is still missing, we 
present the most representative definitions. We then present 
the main criteria used in research works to evaluate QoC. 
We finally compare and analyse these works. 
3.1 Quality of context definitions 
In the domain of context-aware computing, context infor­
mation is known to be inherently uncertain [10, 46]. 
Henricksen and Indulska [46] identified four types of imper­
fection of context information. A context attribute may be 
unknown when there is no infonnation about it, leading 
to incomplete context information. It may also be ambigu­
ous as there is a risk of having contradictory information 
from different context sources. An attribute is imprecise 
when the reported information is correct but not provided 
with a sufficient degree or precision. As context data are 
by nature dynamic and very heterogeneous, they also tend 
to be erroneous and not exactly reflecting the real state of 
the modelled entity. Therefore, one solution that has been 
used for a decade is to attach metadata to context informa­
tion representing its quality. Historically, the importance of 
QoC as a first-class concept for the design of context-aware 
systems bas first been identified by Buchholz et al. [15]. 
The authors define QoC as "any information that describes 
the quality of information that is used as context infor­
mation. Thus, QoC refers to info1mation and not to the 
process nor the hardware component that possibly provide 
the information". Note that they consider that QoC is intrin­
sic to the information and different from the quality of 
the computing service (QoS) and from the quality of the 
hardware device (QoD). In this seminal work, the authors 
have identified five criteria from their expe1ience as the 
most important ones, namely precision, probability of cor­
rectness, resolution, trustworthiness and up-to-dateness. A 
description of these criteria is presented in Section 3.2. 
The notion of worth has then been added by Krause 
and Hochstatter [54] to introduce the point of view of the 
targeted application. Manzoor [62] has pushed this notion 
further by differentiating the objective and the subjective 
views of QoC. The objective view is independent of the 
situation in which context information is used and of the 
consumer requirements for that context information. The 
objective view of QoC is detennined by the characteristics 
of the sensors that have collected the context informa­
tion and how the measurement of the context value took 
place. The subjective view of QoC illustrates how much a 
piece of context conforms to the requirements of a partic­
ular consumer application. Considering the objective and 
subjective nature of QoC, Manzoor [62] then proposes to 
define QoC as an indication of the degree of conformity 
of the context collected by sensors to the prevailing situa­
tion in the environment and the requirements of a particular 
context consumer. This means tbat QoC may vary with dif­
ferent context consumers and that it cannot be measured 
independently of  a context consumer and of the intended 
purpose. 
Bellavista et al. [9] revisit the initial definition of Buch­
holz et al. [15] for the case of context data distribution for 
mobile ubiquitous systems. In addition to the traditional 
and extremely data-focused notion of QoC, they consider 
the quality of the context, data distribution process (e.g. 
data delivery time, reliability, etc.). Whereas Buchholz et 
al. [15] handle separately the three different quality dimen­
sions that they have identified as QoC, QoS and QoD, 
Bellavista et al. [9] argue that it is not always possible to 
clearly separate these three quality dimensions. They there­
fore prefer a broader QoC definition, dealing both with the 
quality of the context data and the quality of the context data 
distribution. 
3.2 Main QoC criteria 
We present in this section the main criteria, i.e. quantifi­
able properties or parameters, that have been proposed in 
the literature to measure QoC. The same tenu is sometimes 
associated with different definitions, and also several terms 
may represent the same concept. Indicators, i.e. targeted val­
ues of the criteria, are usually given, but little is said on the 
metrics that can be used, i.e. the mechanisms or algorithms 
allowing to measure the criteria. This shows that there is no 
consensus on a standard framework for QoC evaluation and 
that more work is still needed. 
We separate QoC criteria into two categories: simple cri­
teria that do not depend on other criteria to be evaluated and 
usually provided by sensors and composite criteria requiring 
the knowledge of some other criteria for their evaluation. 
Simple ;::riteria 
Precision In metrology [49], precision indicates the degree 
of dispersion of a set of measures [62, 72]. Buchholz et 
al. [15] use this term in the meaning of the accuracy (see 
below). Filho [37] defines precision as the level of details 
in which the context information is describing an entity 
of the real world and evaluates it as the ratio of the cur­
rent precision level to the maximum precision level (by 
configuration). 
Resolution Resolution denotes the granulality of infonna­
tion [15] which corresponds to the degree of detail with 
which a sensor can collect data [62], and is part of the sen­
sor characteristics. Filho [37] computes it as the ratio of the 
current granularity level with the maximum granularity level 
( obtained from a configuration file). 
Accuracy In metrology [49], accuracy represents the close­
ness of agreement between a measure and the true value 
as for [37], [63] and [89]. Buchholz et al. [15], under the 
terni. of precision, use bounds to represent the deviation 
from the exact value. Kim and Lee [52] estimate accuracy 
using confidence intervals obtained by a classical statistical 
method. 
Timeliness For Buchholz et al. [15], up-to-dateness or, for 
Kim and Lee [52] and Sheikh et al. [98], freshness repre­
sents the age of context information corresponding to the 
time elapsed between the determination of context informa­
tion and its delive1y to a requester. However, Filho [37] and 
Manzoor et al. [ 64 J redefined it as the degree of rationalism 
to use a context object for a specific application at a given 
time. They compute it as the ratio of the age of the context 
infonnation with the time period and normalize it on [0 .. 1]. 
Composite criteria 
A number of composite QoC criteria can be derived from the 
simple criteria presented previously and also from the com­
bination of sensor characteristics, measurement conditions 
and consumer requirements. 
Completeness Completeness indicates the amount of 
information available in a context observation [52]. 
Manzoor [62] associates a weight to each context attribute 
to represent its importance and computes completeness as 
the ratio of the sum of the weights of the available attributes 
to the total of the weights of all the attributes of a context 
object. Han et al. [44] define a reliability criterion as the 
minimum number --of sensor data that should be collected 
within some time units. Filho [37] redefines completeness 
to integrate timeliness so as to avoid unnecessary computa­
tions and manipulate only current context information. 
Significance This criterion was proposed by Manzoor [62] 
to represent the worth of some context information for a 
specific application. It is also considered by Filho [37]. It 
is computed as the ratio of the critical value of the context 
information to the maximum critical value that a context 
object of that type can have. 
Usability Usability depicts how much a piece of context 
information is suitable for use with the intended purpose 
by the context consumer application [62, 64]. It is equal to 
1 when the provided granularity level of collected context 
information is larger than the required granularity level and 
0 otherwise. 
Probability of correctness The probability of correctness 
estimates how often some context information is uninten­
tionally wrong due to internai errors [15, 88, 98]. Brgulja 
et al. [13] propose to combine different QoC criteria like 
timeliness, context source trustworthiness and precision, to 
calculate the probability of correctness of context informa­
tion. Filho and Agoulmine [38] extend this work by taking 
into account context dependencies among context data that 
may affirm or contradict simultaneously the truth of the 
characterization of a given situation; therefore, a high proba­
bility of correctness indicates that the chances are small that 
the associated context is in contradiction with other context 
information. 
Trustworthiness Filho [37] identified two approaches for 
measuring trustworthiness: (1) measuring how trustworthy 
is the entity that provided the context information like in 
[15] and (2) measuring the belief one can have directly on
the context info1mation. In the first approach, Huebscher
and McCann [ 47] propose a learning model that calculates
trustworthiness based on binary positive/negative feedback
from the users. Manzoor follows the second approach in
[64] and later renamed this criterion reliability [62] and pro­
posed to evaluate it as the inverse of the distance between
the sensor and the entity about which context information is
collected. Neisse [72] argues that trustworthiness is related
to the capability of the context provider to reliably describe
the QoC levels it can guarantee and, as such, should not be
part of the QoC criteria.
Confidence Different research works define the confidence 
attached to some context information. However, the way 
confidence is evaluated was initially limited to a single crite­
rion. It can derive from the generation time of context infor­
mation [14, 96]. Korpipaii et al. (53] compute the probability 
of correctness of context information, while Ranganathan 
et al. [91) rely on the precision of sensor measurement to 
indicate the confidence in context infonnation. 
More recently, some works were proposed to com­
bine several QoC criteria to measure confidence. 
McKeever [68] quantifies the imperfections of vague con­
text (fuzzy membership ), erroneous or conflicting context 
(reliability), imprecision (precise membership) and out-of­
dateness (freshness). These values are then combined to 
evaluate context event confidence. Manzoor [62] proposes 
a confidence inference system that uses fuzzy logic to infer 
the value of confidence. It combines different QoC criteria 
such as reliability, timeliness, completeness, significance 
and usability and takes into account the application QoC 
requirements to prgvide the value of confidence on context. 
Yasar et al. [111] intend to improve the efficiency of 
communication in  large-scale vehicular networks based on 
aggregated quality. It is close to the notion of confidence 
and is delived from two other criteria: QoC and peer repu­
tation. QoC here is computed using four criteria: temporal 
relevance, completeness, significance and spatial relevance. 
Spatial relevance is specific to vehicular networks; it deter­
rnines the distance and the direction of the destination 
node relatively to the source node, providing that contex­
tual information is more relevant when it is received from a 
neighbouring node moving in the same direction. 
3.3 Synthesis of works on QoC 
Table 1 presents a synthesis of the main works on QoC cri­
teria measurement. For simple criteria, a confusion exists 
in the terms used and we recommend to rely on standard 
definitions from the metrology domain or from the ISO 
where available. With regard to temporal aspects, the notion 
of timeliness brings additional knowledge and should be 
favoured. Concerning composite criteria, the two criteria 
of trustworthiness and confidence present commonalities 
which require to be further studied. Besides, the most recent 
works of Filho [37] and Manzoor [62] proposed new crite­
ria with their associated indicators. However, their relevance 
should still be validated on concrete applications. 
Recently, Perera et al. [86] have presented the results of 
a study of 50 research projects on context-aware computing 
covering a decade and analysed their readiness to address 
the issues raised by the IoT. A little less than one-third of 
these research projects (15 over 50) consider the feature of 
QoC although, like we do, Perera et al. identified this feature 
as a requirement of context-aware frameworks for tackling 
the IoT. More work on this tapie is thus clearly needed. Con­
text data coming from billions of sensors may be collected 
in the IoT. Reasoning on ail these context data at once is 
not feasible due to the processing power and time or stor­
age capacity that would be necessary and a selection of the 
appropriate input context data must take place. QoC there­
fore appears as a way to filter out this abundance of context 
data and can help to identify what sensors should be used 
by ranking sensors on QoC criteria. For addressing the new 
challenges of high amount of collected data, openness and 
dynarnicity brought by the IoT with regard to context-aware 
computing, we consider that QoC management frameworks 
should be flexible and efficient and lirnit overhead by com­
puting only the relevant QoC criteria as proposed in [l, 21]. 
They should also be extensible by enabling the definition 
of new QoC criteria including their associated computation 
algorithm as investigated in [65]. 
4 Privacy 
As emphasized by the ITU in its report on the IoT, privacy is 
crucial for the control of this new complex and moving envi­
ronment: "Invisible and constant data exchange between 
things and people, and between things and other things, wil! 
occur unknown to the owners and originators of such data. 
The sheer scale and capacity of the new technologies will 
magnify this problem. Who will ultimately control the data 
collected by ail the eyes and ears embedded in the environ­
ment smmunding us?" [50]. In this section, we first discuss 
privacy definitîons and then review the state of the art of 
privacy technology from the perspective of the IoT. 
4.1 Privacy definitions 
Langheînrich presents a thorough analysis of privacy issues 
in the domain of ubiquitous computing (57]. The author 
revisits old references to privacy in law texts, but notice 
that it is still unclear exactly what privacy means today, 
especially with the new usages provided by communication 
and computing technologies. Warren and Brandeis [109] 
described plivacy as "the right to be let alone". However, 
Langheinrich [57] states that preserving privacy through 
isolation is no longer an option in today's information and 
communication world. Privacy is now usually perceived by 
users as an expectation of being in a state of protection 
without having to actively pursue it. Users actually feel con­
cemed when their privacy gets violated. Marx [66] identifies 
four personal border crossings that are perceived as privacy 
violations: 
A natural border prevents your presence (or feelings 
or emotion) from being perceived through one of the 
Table 1 Synthesis of the QoC criteria used in surveyed works 











ISO definition: dispersion of a set of measures 
Confidence interval. Use in place of accuracy 
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[14, 53, 91, 961 
[62, 68, 111] 
Age of context information 
Rationalism of using a context object 
for a specific application at a given time 
Amount of available context information 
Ratio of weight of available attributes to 
weight of total number of attributes 
Min. number of sensor data to be collected 
within some time 
For available and timely context information 
Ratio of critical value level to max. critical value 
1 if granularity level > requested granulality 
Chances there are no mùntentional errors 
Combination of QoC criteria. Bayesian approach 
No evaluation method explicitly given 
based on feedback from users 
Inverse of distance between entity and sensor 
Single dimension 
Aggregation of QoC criteria 
human senses. Walls, doors, clothes, darkness, sealed 
Ietters, telephone and email messages represent natural 
borders to observation. 
A social border involves expectations that persons with 
certain social roles (doctors, clergy members, lawyers) 
will not disclose confidential information. 
Solove argued that no single privacy definition can be work­
able, but rather that there are multiple forms of privacy 
[101]. He proposed a plivacy taxonomy with an overview of 
the activities that might lead to privacy violations: 
A spatial or temporal border separates information from 
various periods or aspects of one's Iife. 
Borders due to ephemeral or transitory effects: Such 
borders assume that interaction and communication are 
ephemeral and transitory Iike actions that one hopes to 
get forgotten soon or old pictures and Ietters that one 
puts out in the trash. 
Information collection: Although information collec­
tion is usually done with the consent of a person (data 
subject), hidden and forced collections Iead to surveil­
lance or inte1rngation activities that violate the data 
subject's privacy. 
Information processing: Info1mation gets stored, com­
bined and searched, threatening the data subject's 
privacy. 
Infotmation dissemination: When information is dis­
seminated, confidentiality may be breached in mul­
tiple ways. Disclosure may happen with the pub­
lication of truthful facts that might affect the per­
son's reputation. Exposure of private details may 
occur. The accessibilily of already public information 
may increase by disseminating it, like for telephone 
numbers. 
Invasion: Invasion into personal data may occur 
through intrusion into one's life and through decisional 
interference. 
As pointed out by Langheinrich [57] , even though this tax­
onomy intends to be used for legal protections, it may also 
be useful for technologies. Technology providers should 
systematically analyse whether some software or technol­
ogy might increase the chances of such problem to occur, 
and how to mitigate it. This taxonomy matches the context 
management activities and is identified as the most compre­
hensive by Shen and Pearson [99]. It will therefore guide 
our analysis of cur.i'.ent privacy technology. 
4.2 Privacy technology 
We present in this section a synthesis of recent reviews on 
privacy-enhancing technologies (PETs), namely [30, 84, 99, 
104, 108]. The concept of PET can be traced back to the 
early 1980s with the work of Chaum [25], Pfitzmann [87] 
and others focusing on confidentiality in communications 
as an application of the recent invention of public key cryp­
tography. This concept later came out of the academic and 
research corner in the mid-1990s and was promoted by the 
Dutch and Canadian Data Protection Authorities [16, 20] for 
IT product development [106]. 
For a clear presentation of this large variety of solutions, 
we refine the categorization proposed initially by Danezis 
and Gürses [30] and organize this section in three parts with 
privacy as confidentiality, privacy as contrai and privacy 
as transparency. We renamed the third category, entitled 
privacy as practiced in [30], to insist on the recognized 
necessity to provide users with transparency tools for them 
to easily and efficiently control their privacy [57]. 
4.2.1 Privacy as confidentiality 
Confidentiality is usually present in some form in exist­
ing privacy technologies as the first objective of privacy 
is to protect persona! context data from being accessed 
by unauthorized persons. If persona! data become public, 
confidentiality and hence privacy are Iost. Privacy as confi­
dentiality represents the solutions for anonymizing the col­
lected data, anonymizing communications and minimizing 
the collection of data. 
Anonymity of data It relies on cryptographie solutions in 
order to achieve properties like unlinkability (two informa­
tion items or two actions of the same user cannot be related), 
undetectability (an attacker cannot distinguish whether an 
information item ex.ists), unobservability (it is not possi­
ble to detect whether a system is being visited by a given 
user) and communications content confidentiality. The k­
anonymity [103] approach daims that an individual cannot 
be identified within a set of k users. Severa! variants have 
been proposed like l-diversity [60] wbere a block of data is 
[-diverse if it contains at least l well-represented values for 
the sensitive attribute S. Other anonymity metrics have been 
proposed [51]. However, what degree of anonymity is suf­
ficient for a particular use case is dependent on legal and 
social consequences of a data breach and is still an open 
question [34]. Differential privacy aims to provide means to 
maximize the accuracy of queries from statistical databases 
while minimizing the chances of identifying its records [36]. 
Borcea-Pfitzmann et al. [12] underline that data minimiza­
tion as the prime property of ptivacy has reached its limits 
and is now balanced by the users' demands of more and 
more functionality. 
Anonymity in communication Anonymizing communica­
tions aims at protecting traffic data from concealing who 
talks to whom. Even if the content of a communication 
is kept confidential, sensitive information may be leaked 
by traffic data which include locations and identities of 
the communicating parties, time, frequency and volume of 
the communication. Providing anonymous communication 
is challenging since many communication protocols use 
unique identifiers [ 67]. Approaches Iike the pioneering Mix­
Net protocol [25] also known as onion routing and Tor (The 
Onion Router) (35] where encrypted messages are routed 
in an unpredictable path provide a solution. Mobility pro­
tocols such as MIPv6 and HIP need to resort to global 
identifiers (resp. Home Address and Host Identity) that can 
be used to track users and their location. Sorne new archi­
tectures/mechanisms partially address this location privacy 
issue such as IP2 [81], 1\ufnet [95] or Blind [112]. 
Data minimization It aims to limit the collection and pro­
cessing of persona! data. It can be enforced by encrypted 
aggregation techniques like those described in [17, 69]. 
Other approaches include perturbation and obfuscation. Per­
turbation means that data get systematically altered using 
a perturbation function (e.g. adding random numbers [2]). 
Obfuscation means that a ce1tain percentage of data get 
replaced by random values (e.g. replace with the mean). 
Borcea-Pfitzmann et al. [12] underline that data m.inimiza­
tion as the prime property of ptivacy has reached its limits 
and is now balanced by the users' demands of more and 
more functionality. 
4.2.2 Privacy as control 
P1ivacy as control refers to the ability to control what 
happens with personal data and to prevent abuses. This 
encompasses technologies for specifying and enforcing pri­
vacy policies. We first review in this section the legal status 
of privacy protection and then discuss the notions of access 
contro! and usage control po1icies. 
Privacy as a fundamental right International guidelines 
have been defined to protect privacy in [77, 79] and more 
recently in [78] from whlch Wang and Kobsa [108] identify 
a set of 11 fundamental privacy principles: 
1. Notice/awareness: Make policy statements clear and
explicit.
2. Data minimization: Carefully evaluate the necessity,
effectiveness and proportionality of a new technology
before deployment. Prefer the least privacy-invasive
solutions.
3. Purpose specification: Specify the purpose of data
collection at the collection time.
4. Collection limitation: Set lirnits to thecollectionof data.
5. Use limitation: Personal data should not be used or
disclosed for purposes other than those specified.
6. Onward transfer: Do not transfer data to a 3D party if
it does not ensure adequate protection.
7. Choice/consent: Individuals should be provided with
mechanisms, such as opt-in and opt-out mechanisms,
to decide on the collection, use and disclosure of their
persona! data.
8. Access/participation: Individuals can access and
inspect their stored data.
9. Integrity/accuracy: A data controller should ensure
that the collected persona] data are sufficiently accu­
rate and up-to-date to the intended purpose.
10. Security: Protect data against risks such as loss,
unauthorized access, destruction, use, modification or
disclosure.
11. Enforcement: Include mechanisms to enforce privacy
principles.
Following the work of Cavoukian [ 19], one of the Ontario 
privacy comrnissioners, Privacy by Design (PbD) has been 
recently accepted in 2010 [90] as a concrete way to control 
and protect personal data, ensuring the process of compli­
ance with law from the projecting phase and not after, when 
everything has already been carried out and the system is in 
operation. PbD is the key to the future of privacy and can be 
seen as an evolution of PETs with a focus on accountability 
and law application. 
The legal directives also include the Privacy Impact 
Assessment (PIA) that aims to evaluate the risks threatening 
privacy and data protection. PIA requires that organiza­
tions or industries consider in advance what kind of risks 
on privacy an envisioned project may generate. Severa! 
data protection agencies recommend PIAs to ensure legal 
compliance to national and international privacy laws. 
From static to contextual access control policy models 
Access contrai models have been designed to fonnalize 
how to write authorization rules. From mandatory and dis­
cretionary access control to modem-attribute-based models 
that include the concept of context, we will see that the 
more their power of expression increases, the more the dif­
ficulty to write policies for non-technical users increases 
too. Access control models consider three main entities: 
subjects, objects and permissions. Subjects are users or 
applications who can perform actions in the system. Objects 
are resources or services that subjects want to control 
access to. Permissions determine how subjects can access 
resources. Even if these three entities appear in ail mod­
els, their representation has evolved over time to adapt to 
the requirements of modern systems. First access control 
models from the 1970s to the 1990s such as identity-based 
access control models, mandatory access control models or 
·role-based access control (RBAC) models were designed for
stable computing environments involving few mobility. As
a consequence, they did not consider the notion of context.
Sorne of these models, especially RBAC, were extended to
cope with this issue in the 2000s such as [28, 55] or [56].
However, roles were initially defined as a job fonction in an
organization and they are not efficient in a dynamic, open
and context-aware system. A more flexible approach called
attribute-based access control has emerged. Authorization
mles are specified based on any security characteristic of the
subject, resource, action or environment. This approach bas
been reused for integrating the context of a situation like that
in [7] and [29]. Enterprise Privacy Authorization Language
(EPAL) [5] is a formal language to define internai policy.
An enterprise first defines an EPAL vocabulary and can
then specify its own EPAL-custornized policies. This offers
to define rich policies. However, Wang and Kobsa [108)
mention that EPAL lacks a finer granularity in the writ­
ing of rules. Extensible Access Control Markup Language
(XACML) [76] is a popular general-purpose policy lan­
guage which outweighs EPAL in expressing not only access
control policies but also privacy control policies [108].
It is being investigated in [80] to describe context-aware
policies.
Usage control policies In addition to authorizations, pri­
vacy also includes obligations describing how context 
information is handled after access is granted. Obligation 
policies specify some actions that must be achieved to 
control the usage of context information. These actions 
are required to be perfonned by a consumer before, dur­
ing or after the usage of the context information. The 
main well-known policy-based languages and/or related 
frameworks that support obligations expression are usage 
control (UCON) (see [58] for a survey on UCON-based 
approaches), XACML [76], Ponder2 [105] and the OSL­
based framework of Neisse et al. [73]. Because the process 
chain of context data is complex and usage control poli­
cies must be respected at each step, one of the usage 
policy distribution approaches usually consists in bounding 
machine-readable policies to persona! data. This approach 
is called sticky policies. Obligations are kept travelling with 
data along the context processing chain. Access to data can 
be as fine grained as necessary. Encryption mechanisms 
supporting the stickiness of policies to data and a related 
key management allow data attributes to be encrypted based 
on the policy. Access to data is mediated by a Trust author­
ity that checks for compliance to policies in order to release 
decryption key [85]. An example of using sticky policies 
to distribute privacy policies was proposed in the EU FP7 
PrimeLife project [33]. 
ldentity management Modem identity management sys­
tems separate (1) the entity that provides a personalized 
service to users by using information of users from (2) the 
entity that authenticates users and stores data about users. 
These entities are respectively called service provider (SP) 
and identity provider (ldP). Selective disclosure of personal 
data sent by IdPs to SPs has been a core issue in the field of 
identity management. For example, Shibboleth [100] allows 
IdP adnùnistrators to be defined whose attributes are sent 
to specific SPs and OpenID [82] allows users to control 
their persona! information sharing by defining personas. U­
Prove [83] is currently one of the most advanced solutions 
for user-centered identity management focusing on privacy 
providing unlinkability and users' control. The PrimeLife 
project has also proposed an interesting approach that cou­
ples usage policies with an advanced selective disclosure 
mechanism [33]. 
4.2.3 Privacy as transparency 
Transparency tools intend to improve the users' under­
standing and control of their data profile. Castellucia et al. 
[18] identify four characteristics that such tools should
possess:
1. Provide information about the intended collection, stor­
age and/or data processing
2. Provide an overview of what persona! data have been
disclosed to what data controller under which policies.
3. Provide online access to the personal data and how they
have been processed
4. Provide counter profiling capabilîties helping the user
to guess how the data match relevant group profiles,
which may affect future opportunities or risks
Privacy as transparency is an important issue because 
most PETs are useless if people cannot use them efficiently. 
Privacy as transparency is even more critical for the next 
IoT-based distributed systems than it is in the existing web­
based ubiquitous applications. The users (i.e. context data 
owners) will not only have ta control the personal data 
which can be propagated from the terminals with which they 
directly internet (smartphone, laptop) but they will also have 
to handle the control of the data automatically produced 
by the connected things they own, which surround them or 
which are located in their life environments (home, office, 
etc.). These IoT data could be scattered across a large dis­
tributed system while facing issues lilœ heterogeneousness, 
scalability, etc. Despite the importance of this issue, very 
few research works have studied it. For example, Castellu­
cia et al. [18] indicate that there is yet no tool supporting 
characteristic 4 although this is highly desirable as shown 
by the FIDIS project [45]. 
Several research works have been conducted to sim­
plify the users' interaction with their electronic security. 
For example, the P3P Project ("Platfotm for Privacy Pref­
erences" [107]) has defined a standard to simplify users' 
data confidentiality policies of websites to allow people to 
understand how websites manage their data. These poli­
cies are then evaluated according to users' preferences 
by ad hoc mechanisms. Reaching the same goal, lngle­
sant et al. [ 48] proposed a constrained natural language 
for the specification of authorization policies. Stepien et 
al. [102] worked on a non-technical notation for XACML 
policies. 
Sorne approaches try to involve users in privacy man­
agement. Lederer et al. [59] proposed to improve users' 
understanding of the privacy implications by providing them 
feedback. Privacy mirrors [75] allow users to set their pri­
vacy controls and then check how their private data are seen 
from the point of view of the other people. Oglaza et al. 
[80] presented an approach based on multi-criteria decision
suppott techniques for facilitating the process of writing
authorization policies. The PrimeLife project published an
interesting analysis on how to build human-computer inter­
action interfaces for privacy purpose [43].
4.3 Synthesis of works on privacy 
We analyse in this section the state-of-the-art privacy­
enhancing technologies with respect ta context management 
activities as depicted in Fig. 1. These activities correspond 
to the first three types of Solove's taxonomy [101] which 
helps to deduce which PETs should be used [99]. 
During the collection of context data, anonymization 
techniques like k-anonymity can be used to protect data 
from being linked to the user. However, de-anonymization 
attacks, like those in [71], have demonstrated that such tech­
niques are still not safe enough. Differential privacy [36] 
has therefore proposed to rather use perturbation techniques 
to make datasets indistinguishable, which is a promising 
researc11 direction. 
At the time of processing context data, anonymization 
can also be used together with identity management tech­
niques to control data disclosure. As discussed in [30], 
traditional monolithic identity management solutions will 
slow down the informational self-emancipation required by 
privacy as transparency. On this matter, OpenID [82} and 
the friend-of-a-friend social principle [31] are prornising 
approaches and should be further investigated. In addi­
tion, data rninirnization techniques like perturbation [2] 
and obfuscation can Iimit privacy violations caused by 
data aggregation and inference. One issue of current PETs 
for context data processing is to cope with the variety of 
anonymization and data protection mechanisms that can be 
used along the processing chain. This calls for new policy 
languages. 
In the last step of context data presentation and dis­
semination towards context consumer applications, higher 
risks of privacy harms exist as stated by Solove [101]. 
Severa! techniques should be associated, encompassing con­
fidentiality techniques, identity management and access and 
usage control policies. 
Finally, solutions for transparent privacy are valuable in 
all the phases of context management. Users should have 
the choice of the data being collected and processed and 
should be informed of how they are used and for what pur­
pose. There is a clear trend in the solutions for privacy 
as transparency to offer more control to users and further 
work is still urgently needed as leamed from the PrimeLife 
project [43]. As shown in the recent comparison of 50 
research projects on context-aware computing by Perera et 
al. [86], only 11 projects over 50 (about 20 %) did pro­
vide some security and privacy solutions. Privacy solutions 
are key to the success of future commercial context-aware 
services and applications in the IoT, and more work is 
required on this topic. 
5 Privacy and QoC in the Internet of Things 
We discuss in this section the research works that started 
ta consider both privacy and QoC aspects at the same time. 
This opens the way for new enriched privacy solutions 
and for a better control of the QoC of context data. How­
ever, it appears that it also brings an additional complexity 
calling for efficient and effective middleware solutions for 
implementing next-generation context managers able to 
tackle the new challenges raised by the IoT. 
5.1 Works considering both privacy and QoC 
Wishart et al. [110] propose privacy protection mechanisms 
able ta disclose context information at different granular­
ities. The disclosure requirements are expressed following 
a preference model, where the privacy preference states 
whether access is given to a certain type of context and 
the granularity preference indicates what maximum level 
of granularity is accepted. This work is promising in the 
use of obfuscation techniques; however, it only considers 
one QoC characteristic which is the granularity of context 
information. 
Freytag [ 40] reviews research works which intend to 
preserve privacy in location-aware systems and shows that 
fuzzy location information does not automatically imply a 
loss of quality in the result. For Neisse [72] and Neisse 
et al. [74], QoC can be seen as a means to protect the 
user's privacy through the use of obfuscation techniques 
associated to the QoC level of the context infonnation 
provided. 
Chakraborty et al. [22-24] address the concept of 
behavioural privacy as opposed to traditional identity pri­
vacy and propose solutions to prevent the disclosure of 
some of the unintended inferences on user information. 
Their work relates to social networks, and they use a trust 
graph to identify the possible coIIusion possibilities between 
receivers and use it ta detennine how to adjust the qual­
ity of the data shared. The authors propose the criterion of 
resolution to designate the obfuscation level necessary to 
preserve privacy. It is a combination of several QoC criteria 
such as accuracy, precision, timeliness and completeness. 
With this work being dedicated to social networks with 
known relationships between context producers and con­
sumers, the static approach it proposes for defining the tmst 
graph makes it unapplicable in practice to the case of the 
loT. The very high number and the variety of both context 
producers and context consumers in the IoT call for more 
dynamic solutions. 
In addition, QoC raises new issues of confidentiality that 
are not yet addressed by current research. We illustrate them 
through three scenarios [61]: 
Choosing the proper QoC level is not easy: Let us con­
sider that John has a mobile phone equipped with posi­
tioning technology. He wants ta share his location that is 
encoded using the Google address component types for­
mat [41]. John defines a policy to provide only the region 
where be is, which consists in sharing only the attribute of 
the administrative_areaJevel.2 type according to the 
Google fonnat. By using this mechanism, John believes 
that nobody will be able to track him. However, when he 
is at the border of three regions R1, R2 and R3, within a 
short period of time (10 min for instance), the location 
data history will include the three different values R 1, R2 
and R3 • A third-party system may then deduce that John 
is at the crossing border of the three regions. As a con­
sequence, the actual level of detail is then much more 
precise than the one expected by John. In addition to this 
simple example, a recent study conducted by de Mon­
tjoye et al. [32] bas proven that in an anonymized dataset 
"where location of an individual is recorded hourly and 
with a spatial resolution equal to that given by car­
rier antenna, four spatio-temporal points are enough to 
uniquely identify 95 % of the individuals". The spa­
tial resolution of antenna is from 0.15 to 15 km2 . They 
highlight the fact that "a point on the MIT campus at 
3AM is more likely to make a trace unique that a point 
in downtown Boston on Friday evening". These exam­
ples show that even low quality context data are useful 
for data mining �lgorithrns and reliable QoC infonnation 
will improve the efficiency of such algorithms. 
QoC is sensitive iriformation; The first step in preparing a 
security attack on networked systems is the "Reconnais­
sance phase" whose objective is to collect information 
about the target system in order to detect possible known 
vulnerabilities. For example, TCP/IP stack fingerprinting 
consists in collecting configuration values (e.g. the ini­
tial TIL and window size fields) from a remote device 
during standard network communications. The combina­
tion of parameters values may then be used to infer what 
is the remote machine's operating system because dif­
ferent operating systems, and different versions of the 
same operating system, set different default values for 
these parameters. QoC might ease system fingerprinting 
if different systems set different default QoC values. As a 
consequence, QoC is also sensitive information that must 
be protected too. 
QoC change is sensitive infonnation: Context-aware 
computing in the IoT does not allow people to have the 
power to switch off the system or to easily disconnect 
from it if wanted. Sorne researchers have proposed to 
use the concept of white lie to provide people with this 
capability [3]. However, QoC will make white lying 
much more complex to perform. Let us consider the case 
of Mary who is a teenager who provides her location to 
ber parents with a high degree of detail. This is Friday 
evening and Mary tells her parents that she is going to 
visit her grandmother. Actually, she is lying and wants to 
see her friends who live near her grandmother's house. 
Thus, she uses the obfuscation mechanism that changes 
the granularity level of ber location information. How­
ever, when her parents notice that the granularity level 
has changed, they can deduce that their daughter lied 
to them by using algorithms for detecting changes [8]. 
Consequently, people cannot use white lies if QoC infor­
mation is reliable. Thus, obfuscation mechanisms must 
consider that changing QoC level carries information or 
at least allow people to provide false QoC infonnation. 
5.2 Privacy, QoC and the IoT 
While humans are an essential part of current privacy solu­
tions, the need to broaden the scope of these solutions to 
the IoT has recently been acknowledged by the research 
community [11, 86, 97], The IoT enables various kinds of 
communication patterns such as human to human, human 
to thing or thing to thing. lt therefore offers opportunities 
for new emerging applications such as smart g1id manage­
ment, road traffic management, supply chain monitoring, 
crowd and participatory sensing applications or environ­
mental control. These applications have in comrnon relied 
on the fast-paced analysis of a huge amount of strearning 
data gathered from heterogeneous collections of sensory 
sources, in a loosely coupled unpredictable manner and pos­
sibly across multiple administrative domains [11]. Realizing 
such applications implies to revisit traditional privacy and 
QoC solutions. 
In Section 4.2.3, we explained that privacy as trans­
parency is far from being achieved due to the complexity 
for understanding and controlling the context management 
system. Associating QoC metadata to context makes the 
understanding and the control of the system even more 
complex since additional information has to be consid­
ered. One illustration of that point cornes with the for­
mat of data. The granulaiity of location information using 
the Google address format (like "1600", "Amphitheatre 
Parkway", "Mountain View", "CR', "US") is different 
from the granularity of geographic coordinates (like lati­
tude 37.423021 and longitude -122.083739). Obfuscation 
mechanisms manipulating the QoC level of context data 
thus depend on the data format. With the address for­
mat, it is possible to remove an address attlibute (ex: 
keep type=administrative_areaJ.eveLl and country would 
retain only "CN.', "US"). For geographic coordinates, a 
fake point should be calculated adding computing over­
head. Because data format can be diverse especially with 
the heterogeneity of context sources in the loT, there should 
be some standard QoC level with predefined values asso­
�iated to context data and they should be easily inter­
pretable by users. Solutions to master this complexity could 
benefit from mechanisms for improving users' feedback 
interfaces as proposed by the EU FP7 uTRUSTit 
project [42]. 
A distributed IoT architecture, as compared by Roman et 
al. [93] to a centralised architecture, brings multiple bene­
fits in terms of scalability, autonomy and applicability to the 
real world. With such an architecture, all entities connected 
to the IoT have the ability to retrieve, process, combine and 
provide information and services to other entities. However, 
this requires that these entities have sufficient processing 
and storage capabilities to take part to the IoT. Calculat­
ing QoC, filtering on QoC and enabling obfuscation based 
on QoC require computational power. Additionally, most of 
the mo:iels for QoC-based access control are derived frorn 
RBAC which requires to store the Iist of the users associated 
to roles on the device. This calls for more studies to evaluate 
the feasibility and performance of IoT deployrnents where 
all the resources accessible from some device may be used 
in a cooperative manner like in the cloudlet approach [94] 
or with the cyber-foraging paradigm [39]. 
6 Conclusion 
In this article, we analyse the matu1ity of privacy pro­
tection techniques to prepare context management for the 
IoT and envision that privacy solutions should take into 
account the quality of the personal context data manipu­
lated. The loT paradigm bdngs not only new opportunities 
by enabling enriched context-aware services but also new 
challenges faced by next-generation context management. 
We identify three main challenges, narnely (l) the decou­
pling of the production and consumption of context data, 
(2) the need to enable dynamic QoC-aware privacy poli­
cies and (3) the complex interdependency of QoC and 
privacy.
QoC evaluation has been a growing research field over 
the last decade, and we establish a list of the main QoC 
criteria proposed in the literature. However, the relevance 
of some of these criteria must still be validated on con­
crete applications. Additionally, we underline that next­
generation QoC management frameworks should be flexible 
for preserving performance and extensible for allowing to 
define new QoC criteria if needed. The different families 
of PETs are valuable to protect personal context data in 
the context management activities of context data collec­
tion, context data processing and context data presentation 
and dissemination. We, however, show that there are still 
remaining issues like the definition of new policy languages 
allowing to deal with the variety of anonymization and data 
protection mechanisms that can be used along the context 
data processing chain. Also, transparent ptivacy solutions 
are urgently needed for users to feel in control of their 
privacy and adhere to the loT vision. 
The few recent research initiatives exploring how to 
bridge privacy and QoC have started to identify some 
early solutions, but they are not yet sufficient to cater for 
the dynamicity and the various spatio-temporal scales of 
next-generation context management. New models, new 
languages and new frameworks are required and imply 
to gather the various research communities of model 
engineering, knowledge and context management, security 
and privacy as targeted by the ongoing INCOME (http:// 
anr-income.fr) project. 
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